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Jeremy Horder, presently a Tutor in Law at Oxford University and one of the
most eminent theorists of the criminal law in the English-speaking world, has
written the first sophisticated book-length treatment of the philosophical
foundations of excusing conditions. In most respects, his effort is outstanding, and
I highly recommend it for all serious criminal law scholars. Excusing Crime
contains a mountain of insight and detail, and my short review can only scratch the
surface of the issues he canvasses in impressive depth. After a few casual
observations about some of the differences (as I see them) between the landscape
of criminal theory in the United States and Great Britain, I will critically examine
three topics: Horder's concept of what excuses are; his substantive theory of the
conditions under which excuses should be granted; and, finally, his thesis that it is
instructive to arrange types of defenses (including excuses) as rungs on a ladder.
I. CRIMINAL THEORY IN THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN
Horder begins by acknowledging that several existing treatises do an excellent
job summarizing the current state of the law of excuses. What is lacking, he
continues, is a deep examination of the philosophical issues surrounding excusing
conditions. Each of these claims is correct, although I believe that both the
quantity and the quality of treatises in the United Kingdom are significantly higher
than those in the United States. Consider, for example, the outstanding textbooks
produced in the last decade by Andrew Ashworth, J.C. Smith and Brian Hogan,
William Wilson, and Andrew Simester and G.R. Sullivan. In the United States,
only Joshua Dressler's treatise is comparable. No American theorist who decides
to focus on excusing conditions can afford to presuppose that existing law has been
explicated as thoroughly as in Britain.
Notwithstanding his concentration on "why things are as they are, and on how
they should be" (Horder, at 1), Excusing Crime is not simply a book in which a
philosopher presents his grand theory despite knowing or caring little about the
substantive criminal, law itself. Horder is extremely knowledgeable about both
statutes and cases. Unfortunately for readers in the. United States, almost all of
these statutes and cases are English, a fact that is bound to make his monograph
less interesting to legal commentators on this side of the Atlantic. The larger
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philosophical points, of course, are important for theorists everywhere. Even
philosophically, however, Horder is much more engaged (both positively and
negatively) with British commentators; he is less conversant with the parallel
treatment of several of these issues in the United States. The two theorists who
most often serve as foils for the presentation of his views, John Gardner and
Joseph Raz, are Horder's distinguished colleagues at Oxford. Certainly no one can
fault him for the quality of the philosophical company he keeps, although some
American readers will be unhappy about his emphasis on British law.
Nonetheless, those who share his intellectual passion for the philosophical
foundations of excuses can use his research as an opportunity to gain familiarity
with a world of high-level scholarship that they may know less well.
Even though Horder's theoretical ambitions are not narrowly tied to British
law, I have several grounds for predicting that his book will be condemned to a
fairly small American .audience. First, relatively few potential readers in the
United States will be fluent in the latest Oxfordian distinctions between the various
types of reasons that are central to Horder's approach: explanatory reasons,
guiding reasons, operating reasons, auxiliary reasons, exclusionary reasons,
adopted reasons, and the like. Many British commentators (including Horder) are
more persuaded than Americans that the key to solving many of the persistent
problems in criminal law theory is to develop and apply a taxonomy of reasons.
Moreover, the intrinsic difficulty of the topics pursued in Excusing Crime is
exacerbated by the density of Horder's prose. Because he is not an especially
elegant writer, his views are easily misunderstood. When H.L.A. Hart renewed
interest in legal philosophy in the English-speaking world, British theorists had a
well-deserved reputation for writing clearly. At the present time, I believe this
trend has been-reversed. The power of their analyses aside, I now regard American
theorists as better writers. Horder's book might have a greater impact if it were
more accessible. In addition, and perhaps most importantly, criminal theory is
generally healthier and more philosophically advanced in Britain. For whatever
reason, disappointingly few of the most talented American legal philosophers are
drawn to the substantive criminal law.
I wouldbe delighted to be mistaken about the size of the American audience
that Horder is likely to attract, since there is no doubt that theorists everywhere
would profit by paying close attention to Excusing Crime. Many commentators
come to mind who know a lot about the criminal law and have sufficient
philosophical skills to theorize about it constructively. And many excellent
philosophers know enough about the criminal law to write about it productively.
Horder is among a handful of scholars who is both an able philosopher and
extraordinarily knowledgeable about the criminal law itself. This rare combination
is prominently displayed throughout Excusing Crime. It would be difficult to
imagine an American who could have written it; no one quite qualifies as Horder's
counterpart in the United States.
In his preface, Horder worries that "very long monographs are nowadays
destined to remain unread," but hopes his book will prove an exception to this
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trend largely because he has "tried to stay reasonably brief in what I have to say."
(Horder, at ix.) Horder is reasonably brief. He is seldom repetitive, and could
easily have been more long-winded. Still, I fear his book is likely to attract a small
audience for yet another reason he specifically addresses but optimistically
dismisses. He quotes Lindsay Farmer as holding that analytical legal philosophers
tend to produce arguments that are "'[t]oo abstract for the policy maker and too
difficult for the average undergraduate law student,' leaving them to be read only
by other criminal law theorists." (Horder, at 5.) In fact, Horder will ensure that his
views receive a fair hearing in the political arena, since he soon will be leaving his
academic post to join the Law Commission. Without this career move, Farmer
probably would be correct. In rebuttal, Horder praises the intelligence and
qualifications of undergraduates, but I suspect he may be generalizing from his
experience at one of the world's elite institutions. This book is far too difficult for
the undergraduates I have encountered. Of course, law students in the United
States have undergraduate degrees, so they might be competent to understand
Horder's views. Unfortunately, I believe that only a very small percentage of
American law students could reasonably be assigned to read Excusing Crime.
Horder also expresses confidence that judges will consult his work, and provides
examples of English opinions in which Hobbes, Locke, and (even) Descartes have
been cited. To my mind, the paucity of these references tends to support a position
contrary to Horder's. And whatever the case may be in Great Britain, I am certain
that his hope is misplaced in the United States, where criminal justice is
thoroughly politicized and judges almost never engage the best works in legal
philosophy. Unless Horder's new position allows him to become more influential,
I would share Farmer's gloomy prediction that none but a small number of
academic criminal theorists would be likely to make the substantial effort needed
to comprehend Excusing Crime.
Those theorists who invest this effort will be rewarded enormously, for
Horder has produced an outstanding book on excusing conditions. The volume
succeeds both as a general overview, as well as in its remarkable detail. Although
Excusing Crime is rich in countless respects for which I have no space to address
here, I now propose to briefly focus on three of his main themes.
II. THE NATURE OF EXCUSE
Horder's most important structural theme is that one must distinguish "the
considerations that make a claim a candidate for excuse" from "the conditions that
must be satisfied if the candidature is to be successful." (Horder, at 8.) He calls
the former the "necessary conditions," and the latter the "sufficient conditions" for
recognition of an excuse. Horder adopts a broad account of the necessary
conditions. Any claim to excuse:
is an explanation for engagement in wrongdoing (an explanation not best
understood as a justification, as a simple claim of involuntariness, or as
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an out-and-out denial of responsibility) that sheds such a favorable moral
light on D's conduct that it seems entirely wrong to convict, at least for
the full offence. . . . Excuses excuse the act or omission amounting to
wrongdoing, by shedding favorable moral light on what D did through a
focus on the reasons that D committed that wrongdoing. (Horder, at 8-
9.)
Even though the foregoing condition is met, a court should deny an alleged
excuse unless the law's "strategic" conditions are satisfied. Roughly, these
sufficient conditions involve the need to maintain the integrity and flourishing of a
common good. (Horder, at 14.) A few examples of these common goods are as
follows. The state must take care that the availability of a defense does not
undermine a culture of compliance and law-abidingness, discourage the emergence
of a "defense industry" that will result in the success of too many unmeritorious
claims, ensure that the circumstances in which a defense is pleaded do not entail
intractable problems of proof, and maintain a relationship between the judiciary
and the legislature in which it is mutually understood that the former must take
responsibility for the resolution of morally complex issues raised by an excusatory
claim that is beyond the competence of the adversarial process to resolve in a
satisfactory way.
I do not regard the terms "necessary" and "sufficient" conditions to be
perspicuous in drawing the contrast Horder intends to make; this distinction might
as well have been described as reasons in favor of and reasons against recognizing
an excuse. The former are mostly "desert-based"; the latter are largely
consequentialist. Alternatively, the supposed necessary conditions might be
thought to identify the concept of excuse; a substantive theory, to qualify as a
theory of excuses, must show why given kinds of conduct should be viewed in a
favorable moral light. In any event, many of the difficult questions about whether
to allow an excuse in a particular case involve the interplay of Horder's two
conditions. First, does the explanation for the defendant's wrongdoing indeed cast
his conduct in a favorable moral light? If so, must the state nonetheless deny the
excuse because of its concern for the foregoing "strategic" or "common goods"?
Decisions about whether the necessary conditions are satisfied are largely intuitive,
and I will return to this matter in Part III. But if a given plea passes this first test,
how are we to assess whether it also passes the second? Obviously, no formula
exists to ascertain whether the strategic considerations loom sufficiently large to
justify withholding a given excuse. Horder acknowledges that judges typically
exaggerate the likelihood that granting a defense will have adverse social
consequences. (Horder, at 18.) In reply, he ably argues that denying the excuse
can frequently bring the law into more disrepute than accepting it.
Although much of Excusing Crime discusses factors that contribute to
locating the optimum balance between these two conditions, the task as Horder
performs it is frequently too speculative for my taste. My hunch is that the
probability of undermining the law's common goods is more a function of the
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publicity surrounding a case than of abstract features of the case itself. Excusing a
delusional defendant who attempts to assassinate the President will have more
deleterious consequences for strategic goods than would excusing a defendant with
a comparable mental defect whose crime is less notorious. The public is bound to
misunderstand the contrast between justification and excuse, and would be likely
to proclaim an excuse as authorizing an open season on assassinations. But
empirical evidence would be preferable to conjecture. A useful strategy in
weighing Horder's necessary and sufficient conditions would draw from historical
experience. Can we provide real examples of excuses that courts have extended so
charitably that common goods have been undermined? Sometimes this allegation
has been raised about the insanity defense, but tangible evidence for this fear is
hard to produce. Stories about clever defendants who dupe gullible juries are more
the subject of fiction than reality. Although Horder is rightly critical of theorists
who neglect strategic concerns altogether, I am inclined to side with those who
believe that denying excuses on this ground is always a matter of extreme regret
for which substantial evidence rather than speculation or anecdote should be
required. The criminal law is the institution par excellence in which justice to the
individual is paramount.
I want to mention just a few of the significant features of Horder's general
characterization of the necessary conditions. Notice that excuses, according to this
account, presuppose wrongdoing. No wrongdoing, no excuse. This claim is not
simply about when an excuse is needed; it is about when an excuse can exist at all.
Moreover, excuses preclude justifications. If conduct is justified, it cannot be
excused. Presumably, Horder does not believe that agents can simultaneously
possess two defense types: one a justification, the other an excuse. In addition,
excuses necessarily focus on the reasons for which the defendant acted. Hence,
putative excuses that cannot be understood in terms of reasons simply are not
excuses at all. Partly because of his focus on reasons, Horder departs from
virtually all American theorists in denying that insanity and infancy function as
genuine excuses (instead, he regards them as conferring an exemption from
liability). Also, Horder's characterization asks whether the defendant's conduct is
to be cast in a favorable moral light. Many theorists, by contrast, conceptualize
excuses as more about agents than about their acts. Each of these features of
Horder's account might be challenged.
Rather than disputing any of these claims, however, I want to comment on an
additional aspect of Horder's characterization of excusing conditions. An implicit
contrast is presupposed in order to decide whether an agent should be excused.
Relative to what, in other words, do we decide whether the agent's reasons for
wrongdoing cast his behavior in a favorable moral light? This question asks for a
baseline by reference to which such determinations are made. One might assume
the relevant baseline to be the moral judgment the defendant's conduct would have
warranted in the absence of the alleged excuse. In many cases, however, this
answer is unintelligible. Suppose we debate whether the fact that the offender was
seventeen years old at the time of his offense provides a partial excuse for his
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crime. We can certainly compare this particular defendant with another who
commits the same offense and is not seventeen. But how old do we imagine the
latter to be? Similar questions can be raised about other potential excuses. We can
contrast a given defendant with someone who commits the same offense but is not
under duress, for example. But why, we then must ask, does the latter commit the
crime? Everyone commits an offense for some reason. Relative to what
motivation(s) do we decide whether the defendant's explanation for wrongdoing
casts his behavior in a favorable moral light? As far as I can tell, Horder's account
of the necessary conditions of excuses is unhelpful in solving this problem.
We should also note that excuses, as so conceived, are relative to the content
of the substantive criminal law. Suppose that two defendants steal different
amounts of money. Does the fact that the first took less than the second cast his
behavior in a favorable moral light? The legislature may already have provided
the answer to this question by creating distinct offenses of grand and petty larceny.
If the amount taken by the defendant makes him guilty only of the lesser offense,
he can hardly make the argument that this same fact makes him eligible for a
partial excuse. But ifra jurisdiction does not distinguish between two grades of
theft, this argument would seem plausible and might be accepted.
The fact that wrongdoing is built into Horder's concept of excuses also shows
the dependency of his view on assumptions about the content of the substantive
criminal law. What are we to say about statutes that may not proscribe
wrongdoing at all? Can a theory of excuses compensate for defective statutes?
Suppose a jurisdiction does not allow patients to remove prescription drugs from
their original containers. A defendant arrested at a border engaged in this offense
prior to his vacation for the convenience of not having to carry his medicines in a
dozen different bottles. Does this (presumably common) reason cast his behavior
in a favorable moral light? I am unable to answer one way or the other, since the
conduct proscribed does not seem wrongful in the first place. If the statute does
not proscribe wrongdoing, it makes little sense to ask whether the behavior of a
particular defendant should be viewed favorably.
III. THE SUBSTANCE OF EXCUSES
When should wrongdoing be viewed in a favorable moral light? The answer
to this question calls for a substantive theory of excuses. If excuses are granted
whenever the wrongful conduct of the defendant is assessed positively (relative to
some unspecified baseline), one would expect that the criminal law would be
receptive to an astonishingly broad array of excusing conditions. Obviously, the
reality of criminal justice has not conformed to this expectation. Apart from
denials of responsibility, existing law mostly confines the domain of excuses to
duress, provocation, and mistake. Nor have theorists (with a handful of prominent
exceptions) tended to endorse Horder's calls for a substantial expansion of
excusing conditions. What accounts for this reluctance? Is it largely due to moral
disagreement about whether the necessary conditions for granting an excuse have
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been satisfied? Probably not. Of course, some such disagreement is inevitable,
and I am unsure how it might be resolved. Perhaps Horder would have made more
progress in this difficult matter by reflecting on aggravating factors-reasons that
cast wrongdoing in an unfavorable moral light. Surprisingly, he barely mentions
aggravation, and decisions about whether conduct should be viewed favorably
remain largely intuitive.
Consider a few troublesome examples. Suppose a defendant assaults doctors
who perform abortions. Does he deserve a partial excuse? We may be unclear
whether his reasons for wrongdoing cast his behavior in a favorable light relative
to persons who commit garden-variety assaults. Or does this defendant's plea fail
because he does not satisfy Horder's sufficient conditions for leniency? And what
about contemporary Robin Hoods? Although persons who steal from the rich to
give to the poor surely merit our sympathies relative to typical thieves who pocket
the fruits of their crimes, Horder agrees with those commentators who conclude
that strategic concerns require the excuse to be withheld. Robin Hood Violates
individual rights, and has no moral basis to decide for himself whose property
entitlements may be breached. But should we think otherwise of a Robin Hood
who did not violate -individual rights, and gained the money he distributed to the
poor by cheating on his taxes? It seems suspiciously ad hoc to insist that strategic
concerns always predominate in such cases. We again confront the intractable
difficulty of deciding whether the need to preserve strategic goods swamps the
claim in favor of allowing the excuse. In any event, unless Horder's basic
approach is fundamentally misguided, we should be puzzled about why both courts
and commentators have been loathe to broaden the range of excusing conditions.
For some reason, few criminal theorists appear to share Horder's charitable
sentiments. Instead, they have tended to construct elaborate theories that severely
limit the conditions under which wrongdoing should be viewed favorably. No
single theory of excuses has garnered a consensus. According to the most well-
known positions, defendants merit a complete or partial excuse when their
wrongful conduct manifests some defect of capacity for choice, or deviates from
their settled character, or lives up to what should be expected of them in their
particular role. Horder offers penetrating criticisms of each such account,
persuasively arguing that they are both too broad and (perhaps more importantly)
too narrow. Legal philosophers who endorse one of these theories will have much
to learn from Horder's thoughtful objections. But what does he offer to replace the
alternatives he rejects? No simple answer is given.
Among the most striking features of Excusing Crime is the lack of a grand
generalization about the conditions under which wrongdoing should be assessed in
a favorable moral light. Despite the absence of an overarching principle, what
Horder calls his "liberal" theory respects personal autonomy by expanding the
variety of excusing conditions far beyond those currently recognized by law.
Because he is largely interested in legal reform, Horder has relatively little to say
about existing excuses (although he has written about them extensively elsewhere).
Instead, the final half of his book is devoted to a fascinating discussion of three
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circumstances in which he argues that our criminal justice system is too
unreceptive to defendants.
First, he defends the partial excusatory significance of diminished capacity for
"shortcomers"-defendants who suffer from a handicap that badly hampers their
ability to comply with the law-but is not so serious as to negate mens rea or to
preclude their responsibility altogether. (Horder, at 106-07.) Something very
close to the excuse for which he argues is currently available in prosecutions for
murder under the Model Penal Code, as well as in a handful of jurisdictions in the
United States. Horder, however, can find no good reason to confine it so narrowly.
He urges the creation of "second degree" offenses for nearly all crimes, especially
those in which defendants face severe sentences. His case in favor of a partial
excuse of diminished capacity for crimes in addition to homicide is made largely
by addressing the reservations of John Gardner, who allows no excusatory space
between what is expected of us on a given occasion as human beings, and what
individuals are personally capable of achieving in light of their particular
limitations. The age-old problem is the difficulty of distinguishing between the
defendant who possesses normal abilities of self-control but fails to exercise them
from the defendant who lacks normal abilities to exercise. Although Horder does
not regard this obstacle as insuperable, no device to surmount it would be easy to
implement.
Second, Horder contends that our criminal justice system should be less
punitive toward defendants whose conscience demands wrongdoing. A liberal
state cannot insist that persons sacrifice their beliefs in order to comply with a legal
demand without placing a disproportionate emphasis on the importance of law-
abidingness, thereby unduly limiting our prospects for achieving personal
autonomy. (Horder, at 199.) Existing law is not entirely unreceptive to these
claims, although it mostly affords them significance through reductions in
sentences (if not by prosecutorial discretion). Like many theorists, Horder finds
these solutions inadequate. He rightfully stresses the significance of conviction
itself, the judgment courts render should accurately reflect what defendants have
actually done. In any event, the law's reluctance to at least partially excuse
conscientious wrongdoers is seldom due to a failure to assess them favorably.
Instead, courts and commentators have emphasized various strategic reasons to
deny the defense. In particular, they have worried that the law will be brought into
disrepute by too many specious claims. Horder argues that this assumption is
frequently mistaken. What steps can we take to safeguard the law's common
goods? Horder's answers are extraordinarily nuanced, and I cannot begin to do
them justice here. One of several suggestions is to limit excuses derived from
demands of conscience to those offenses that do not violate individual rights.
(Horder, at 202.) Thus a defendant who cites religious beliefs as the reason for not
seeking medical assistance for his seriously ill child is entitled to less favorable
treatment than a defendant who alleges similar reasons for not providing a blood
specimen to the police who suspect he was driving while intoxicated.
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Because personal autonomy plays such a central role in Horder's approach
overall, he finds no good reason to limit demands of conscience excuses to cases in
which these demands are moral The state should not be quick to require
defendants to sacrifice non-moral values central to their personal identity.
(Horder, at 203.) For example, Horder contends that the law should partially
excuse persons who survive mutual suicide pacts. Suppose the defendant and his
spouse agree that neither of their lives are worth living without the continued
presence of the other, and the health of one or both is threatened by a terminal
illness. The defendant accedes to the victim's request to be killed, and then
botches his subsequent attempt to end his own life. Horder is right to conclude
that this situation represents a "paradigm case for partial excuse." (Horder, at
203.) I am less convinced, however, that he is correct to describe the excuse as
only partial, since the defendant's action "involves a serious violation of [the
victim's] individual rights." (Horder, at 203.) His general point, however, is
profound and correct: If the aim is to protect personal autonomy, defendants whose
conscience demands wrongdoing may qualify for an excuse despite lacking a
moral reason to commit the offense.
Horder is somewhat less sympathetic to claims of civil disobedience, which
differ from demands of conscience primarily in their political motivation.
Strategic concerns frequently militate against excusing these acts. To my mind,
Horder's general reluctance to allow this defense reflects an ideal and abstract
conception of the legislative process that often is unrelated to the political realities
of how statutes are enacted. He continually emphasizes that legislatures in a
democratic state are "better placed than any individual or (protest) group
adequately to account for all the reasons that bear on what is to count as the right
guidance to follow." (Horder, at 224.) Horder surely is correct to conclude that
legislatures are "better placed" than protest groups to evaluate all of the reasons
that bear on claims of civil disobedience. One wonders, however, what should be
done in cases in which legislatures have reached decisions for reasons other than
the merits. The "war on drugs" in general, and the controversy about medical
marijuana in particular, provide useful illustrations. In California today, facilities
are prosecuted by federal authorities for providing medical marijuana to patients
pursuant to state law. Defendants are eager to present their case, but no
government agency seems willing to examine the increasingly embarrassing body
of scientific evidence in favor of using marijuana as medicine. I am unsure what
Horder himself thinks about this ,issue. But anyone who would deny a defense on
the ground that legislatures are "better placed" than doctors and their patients to
decide on effective treatments for medical conditions would fail to understand the
political forces that drive contemporary drug policy.
Third, Horder argues that judges should recognize a defense of due diligence
for the growing number of crimes of strict liability. He employs unusually strong
language to criticize the timidity of the legal minds that retarded the development
of this defense in recent history. Even when statutory language cannot be strained
to find hidden evidence of a fault requirement, courts should develop the criminal
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law in a morally sound way by acquitting defendants who did all that could
reasonably be expected of them to avoid wrongdoing. According to Horder, the
need for an excuse of due diligence comes from two sources. First, a liberal state
should ensure that defendants have ample opportunities to provide an explanation
for their wrongs. If no explanation can be given-if no precautions to avoid
wrongdoing are recognized as a defense-the fairness of a trial is threatened "in
that one has no self-sufficient moral reason, qua individual defendant, to engage
constructively and co-operatively in the trial process." (Horder, at 255.) A second
and more weighty consideration, in my opinion, derives from the fact that stigma
attaches to a criminal conviction. The liberal state must strenuously avoid the
imposition of unjustified stigma, much as it avoids unjustified discrimination or
prejudice. As this latter consideration suggests, the real problem is with the
content of strict liability statutes. What Horder treats as an excuse is designed to
correct for deficiencies in the substantive criminal law itself.
Curiously, Horder qualifies his general views about the importance of a due
diligence defense. For example, British law has created an offense of failing to
ensure that one's child attends school regularly. The relevant statute provides for a
number of specific justifications and excuses, but due diligence is not among them.
Horder tentatively concludes that "a parent who could not have done more to
ensure their child attended regularly at school, but cannot make use of any of the
specific defenses, is simply unlucky." (Horder, at 256.) I fail to understand why
parents should be stigmatized when they are unsuccessful despite making all
reasonable efforts to ensure the attendance of their schoolchildren.
For the most part, however, Horder's reasons for recognizing excuses in these
three areas are original and persuasive. I am more surprised by what he did not
say. Since a liberal theory that values personal autonomy is so receptive to
proposals to expand the number and range of excusing conditions, I am mildly
disappointed that Horder did not discuss additional claims of possible excusatory
merit. For example, he makes only passing reference to a possible excuse of
ignorance of law, explicitly endorsing an excuse only when a defendant's legal
ignorance is induced by legal officials or (perhaps) by barristers. It seems
plausible (to me) to go further; a defendant who did not believe (or even suspect)
his conduct was illegal and would not have done what he did had he known the
truth compares favorably with a defendant who commits the same offense while
understanding perfectly well that his behavior was criminal. Such persons gain a
limited degree of my sympathy even when their ignorance is unreasonable.
Obviously, opportunities to feign ignorance are plentiful. But if the law is to
become more charitable in extending partial or complete excuses, enlarging the
narrow principles about ignorance of law seems a sensible place to begin. The
exdusatory significance of ignorance of law seems as strong as that pertaining to
shortcomers, persons who respond to demands of conscience, or defendants who
exercise due diligence to avoid wrongdoing. Then again, Excusing Crime does not
pretend to be the last word on which excuses should be recognized, and I am sure
that Horder would welcome applications of his liberal theory in new directions.
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IV. A DEFENSE LADDER?
The final theme of Excusing Crime I propose to briefly discuss is that various
excuses can meaningfully be placed on what Horder calls a "ladder." (Horder, at
102.) Among the central questions about excuses is how they relate to other kinds
of defenses, and how many other kinds of defenses must be distinguished. Many
theorists-perhaps most-believe that justifications have a logical and/or a
normative priority to excuses. Horder shares this basic position, and extends it
throughout the entire realm of the defense types he contrasts. Although the details
are complicated-Horder frequently admits that one rung can blur into another-
his ladder consists of the following six rungs:
Rung 1: transformative justifications, negating wrongfulness
Rung 2: justifications for wrongdoing (e.g. self-defense; necessity)
Rung 3: some full excuses (e.g. duress; excessive defense)
Rung 4: some full or partial excuses (e.g. provocation)
Rung 5: the partial excuse of diminished capacity
Rung 6: denials of responsibility (insanity; diminished responsibility)
(Horder, at 103.)
I confess that I don't fully understand this whole endeavor. I do not insist that
the project of arranging defense types in a hierarchy is fundamentally mistaken; I
only seek to clarify it in order to be capable of assessing it. What exactly is this a
ladder of, to what do these rungs correspond? I am unsure whether the ladder
purports to describe logical relations between types of defenses. Horder
emphatically believes that "claims of true justification are inconsistent with
seeking excuse" (Horder, at 49), but I do not know whether he thinks that similar
logical relations obtain between each successive step. Instead, his thesis is
primarily normative; it is better for a defendant if his defense is placed higher up
the ladder and worse if it lies nearer the bottom. Since all complete defenses result
in acquittal, we must ask: Better or worse for whom, and in what respect? In
answering these questions, Horder does not attempt to improve upon the sketchy
remarks of Gardner, who writes: "When I say 'best' and 'worst' here I mean best
and worst for us: for the course of our lives and for our integrity as people."
(Horder, at 99.) Surely more needs to be said. But is this quotation helpful at all?
What business is it of the criminal law-especially a liberal theory of the criminal
law-to make judgments about what is best for us in the course of our lives?
Horder (and Gardner) must mean that these judgments are moral. The law itself
does not make these judgments; they are made by legal theorists who hope to bring
normative sense to the issue of how various legal defenses are related to one
another.
I simply do not know what kinds of intuitions I should consult to test whether
we should agree or disagree with the proposal to arrange defense types on a moral
ladder. Should I imagine two cases in which everything is constant other than the
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fact that the defendants plead defenses that are placed on different rungs? If I have
correctly described the relevant thought experiment, I fail to see why Horder (and
Gardner) are so confident about how the steps on the ladder are ordered. In
particular, I do not understand the basis of their confidence that denials of
responsibility (rung 6) are the worst kinds of defenses to have. Perhaps we readers
are invited to imagine how we would react if we engaged in wrongdoing but were
told that we were not responsible agents. Is this not a grievous insult? Would we
not feel less than fully human?
But is our reaction to this question really decisive? An intuitive challenge to
Horder's proposal might begin with an incomplete story in which two criminal acts
have been performed: Smith and Jones deliberately inflict a fairly serious but not
life-threatening injury on White and Black respectively. Imagine the story is
embellished in either of two ways. In the first scenario, Smith's behavior is
permissible, although not commendable. Suppose White is an impoverished thief
who is escaping with Smith's television set. Smith's defense, I assume, belongs on
rung two. In the second scenario, Jones is well below the age of criminal
responsibility, and injures Black in a schoolyard brawl. Alternatively, in another
version of the second scenario, Jones's agency has been seriously impaired by an
evil scientist (who figures so prominently in philosophical thought experiments).
Even if Jones has not acted in self-defense, I assume he has (what I would call) an
excuse; his defense should be placed on rung six (or perhaps five). From a moral
point of view, why should we conclude that Smith's defense is superior to that of
Jones? Smith's explanations for wrongdoing, in my opinion, cast him in a worse
moral light. Had I seriously injured a person at some point in my life, I would be
less ashamed and repentant about having done so under the circumstances
described in either version of the second scenario. Do such intuitions (assuming
they are widely shared) falsify the sequence of rungs Horder has constructed? I
think so, but cannot be sure. Arguably this counterexample does not present
problems for Horder because we should imagine that one and the same person has
two different defense types for the same criminal act. But I do not understand how
we can possibly imagine one and the same defendant to be wholly lacking in
responsibility while simultaneously acting from a justification. We can imagine a
given defendant who is capable of having a justification but is temporarily lacking
in responsibility, because, for example, he is sleepwalking. If this is the relevant
thought experiment, I again believe most readers will concur with my intuitive
judgment that the sleepwalker who injures another has little or nothing to be
ashamed of; his defense does not reflect negatively on the course of his life or on
his integrity as a person.
The case against the ladder Horder constructs is bolstered if we believe (as
many do) the following propositions. Suppose that agent-relative reasons can give
rise to a justification rather than to an excuse. Perhaps I am justified rather than
excused if I push someone from a plank in order to save myself. Suppose further
that mistakes about justifications, even when reasonable, give rise to an excuse
rather than to a justification. Perhaps I am excused rather than justified when I
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reasonably but falsely believe that I must push a single individual from the plank to
save two others. Again, why think that the (former) justification casts the agent in
a better moral light than the (latter) excuse? A theorist may respond to my
proposed counterexamples by reclassifying the defenses I have described. Perhaps
reasonable mistakes about justifications can justify, while agent-relative reasons
cannot. Admittedly, all such categorizations are highly controversial. How should
we decide which categorizations are correct? I hope that no one will appeal to a
pre-existing ladder as the basis for supposing that my classifications must be
wrong. Surely our level of confidence in the claim that defense types are arranged
in a particular way is not so great that its truth must be preserved by our decision
about how to categorize given defenses. These issues require clarification and
further thought. Despite the problems I have tried to raise, among the many virtues
of Excusing Crime is its sophisticated attempt to specify the relations among the
several types of defenses recognized by the criminal law.

